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Abstract
In this paper we develop a portfolio balance model which can be used to make an equitable comparison of
alternative exchange rate regimes. Our point of departure from standard portfolio models is that we derive all
asset demand functions from microeconomic behavior. As Helpman and Razin (1979) and Lapan and Enders
(1980) have observed, all asset demand and expenditure functions used in a comparison of exchange rate
systems must be consistent with individual optimizing behavior. This seemingly innocuous observation
implies that many of the macroeconomic comparisons of fixed and flexible exchange rates are not legitimate.
Inherent in any portfolio balance model is the implication that asset demand functions depend upon the joint
distribution of asset yields. As long as there are different risks in different exchange regimes, portfolio
allocation rules will change when the exchange rate regime changes.
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In this paper we develop a portfolio balance model which can be used to
make an equitable comparison of alternative exchange rate regimes. Our
point of departure from standard portfolio models is that we derive all
asset demand functions from microeconomic behavior.—^ As Helpman and Razin
(1979) and Lapan and Enders (1980) have observed, all asset demand and
expenditure functions used in a comparison of exchange rate systems must be
consistent with individual optimizing behavior. This seemingly innocuous
observation implies that many of the macroeconomic comparisons of fixed and
flexible exchange rates are not legitimate. Inherent in any portfolio
balance model is the implication that asset demand functions depend upon the
joint distribution of asset yields. As long as there are different risks in
different exchange regimes, portfolio allocation rules will change when the
exchange rate regime changes. In general, one cannot postulate a set of
asset demand equations and then hold various income, interest rate, and
wealth elasticities constant when the exchange regime changes* Instead, the
approach used in this paper Is to derive the behavioral rules of individuals
from the postulate of expected utility maximization. The individual demand
and supply functions are aggregated in order to characterize macroeconomic
equilibrium under fixed and flexible exchange rates. Once the properties of
macroeconomic equilibrium are obtained, it is possible to determine which
exchange regime yields the highest level of such variables as the capital
stock, aggregate consumption, and expected utility.
A second reason for using a micro-theoretic approach is that the choice
between exchange regimes can be made using a single criterion: the optimal
exchange regime is the one which maximizes the expected utility of individu-
2/
als.— Intermediate goals such as price or consumption stability may not be
3/in accord with individual preferences.— To take a simple"example, 01
(1961) demonstrates that price variability may be desirable if the degree of
risk aversion is sufficiently low. Thus, any finding indicating that a
flexible exchange rate insulates an economy from external price variability
has little normative content unless individual attitudes towards risk are
known.
In this paper we extend the work on micro-theoretic models of exchange
rates in several directions. Helpman and Razin (1979) argue that a consis
tent comparison of exchange regimes requires that agents face the same
objective constraints regardless of the exchange regime. On this basis, it
is claimed that it is inappropriate to compare a system of fixed rates (in
which central" banks hold foreign currency) to a flexible rate system in
which there is complete currency immobility. Helpman and Razin (1979) and
Kareken and Wallace (1977) demonstrate that in the absence of a country-
specific demand for money, the presence of complete currency mobility
renders a constant rate of exchange even if the central banks refrain from
Intervention in the foreign exchange market. As long as currencies are
perfect substitutes, there will not be any change in the relative price of
I
currencies. However, in Lapan and Enders (1980), we have shown that it is
perfectly legitimate to compare a system of fixed rates to a system of
flexible rates with complete currency immobility: flexible rates (without
currency mobility) were shown to yield a higher level of expected utility
than fixed rates when agents were sufficiently risk averse. ^
In this paper we expand upon the work of Helpman and Razin (1979) and
Kareken and Wallace (1981) by allowing for country-specific demands for
money. We believe that there is little to be gained by comparing a system
of fixed rates to a system of flexible rates in which the exchange rate is
constant. A virtue of these papers not found in Lapan and Enders (1980) is
the presence of interest-bearing assets. In Lapan and Enders, currency was
the only store of value; a flexible rate without currency movements implied
that no real saving was possible* In the model developed below, we allow
domestics to hold domestic currency and real physical capital. By introduc
ing real capital into the analysis, we allow individuals to save when the
exchange rate is flexible. More importantly, we are able to examine the
effects of alternative exchange regimes on the capital accumulation process
without having to specify ad hoc asset demand equations. Using the micro-
theoretic approach, the demand for capital under each exchange regime will
be consistent with individual maximizing behavior.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section II, we develop the
model and obtain the individual behavioral rules that agents obey.
Section HI obtains the macroeconomic equilibrum results for a system of
flexible rates. Results are obtained for the cases of perfect foresight and
rational expectations. In Section IV, we consider macroeconomic equilibrium
for the case of fixed rates and perfect foresight. It is this section which
contains our principal results concerning the comparison of alternative
exchange regimes. Unfortunately, we are not able to provide an analytic
solution for the case of fixed rates and rational expectations. In
Section V, we present a Monte Carlo study and compare fixed and flexible
rates when agents have rational expectations. Conclusions are presented in
Section VI.
11. The Model of Individual Behavior
In order to derive the microeconomic demand functions, we consider an
\
overlapping generations model of the type developed by Samuelson (1958).
The economy consists of agents who live for two periods, and there are N
members of each generation- In the first period of life, each individual
supplies one unit of labor to a firm which combines the labor input with
capital to produce output. Production functions are homogeneous of degree
one in capital and labor and contain a multiplicative productivity term.
While this productivity term changes from period to period, the return to
labor is the realized marginal product of labor- Once outputs are realized
and Income is received, workers decide how to divide their income between
consumption and saving. Wealth can be held in two forms: domestic currency
and physical capital. For simplicity, we consider a one commodity/putty-
clay framework in which capital lasts only one period. The portfolio size
and composition decisions are made in such a way that agents maximize
expected utility. At this point, the agent enters the second period of life
as a capitalist. The individual now hires labor and pays the workers their
realized marginal product. Since capital lasts only one period and there is
no bequest motive, the agent consumes an amount equal to his/her real money
holdings plus the difference between output and labor payments. After
consumption in the second period of life, the individual leaves the economic
system, and a new generation is born.
We assume that all agents have identical preferences and are identical
in all essential ways. Each person has the utility function:
(C.Dt+i)^
1) 23 ; 3 0, e < 1
= InCj. + lnD^_|_j; 3 = 0
where = utility of an agent born at period t; = consumption in t of an
agent born at t; = consumption in t+1 of an agent born at t; and 3 is a
4/
measure of risk aversion.— Note that the willingness of an agent to under
take a gamble is positively related to the magnitude of 3*
Since money and capital are the only assets, the consumption In (t+1)
of an agent born at t
®t+l " ^t+l^^t+1 \+l\+l
where - nominal money balances that the agent brings into t+1, ~
real capital that the agent brings into t+1, ^ " price level in t+1, and
= real payment to capital in t+1.
The amount of money and capital brought into period t+1 is the difference
between labor income in t and consumption in t» Since workers in t supply
one unit of labor:
3) P^(W^ - C^) =
where = price level in t and W^. - real wage in t.
Given the constraints of equations 2) and 3), individuals born at time
t choose C^, \+i» ^t+1 maximize their expected utility. We will
consider two alternative expectational assumptions: perfect foresight and
rational expectations.
Turning to the production side, we assume technology exhibits constant
returns to scale; in particular, we let the output of firm 1 be given by:
A) Qt =
where 4"^* kJ and represent the multiplicative productivity disturbance,
capital and labor supply, respectively, for firm 1 at time t. Furthermore,
we assume that c|>^ is identical for all firms at time t; thus, aggregate
output at t can be represented by:—^
4')
where K^, represent the aggregate factor supplies at t. When perfect
foresight is present, we assume agents know the realizations of <l>j for all
j; under rational expectations, agents at t are assumed to know the true
distributions of 4'.> but not the realizations of for j > t«
3 J
Furthermore, it is assumed that the are distributed independently, but
identically, across time*
Assuming competition prevails in factor markets and that agents are
paid their realized marginal products (thereby exhausting the total
product):
5)
6) = att)^(k^)^ ^
where k^. is the aggregate capital-labor ratio at t. For simplicity, we
normalize the labor supply of each agent to unity so that aggregate labor
supply is N. Individual agents treat (k^) as exogenous to their actions;
thus, agents at (t-1) know the true distribution (or value) of but take
it to be exogenous to individual actions-—^ Returning to the individual
maximization problem, the agent at t chooses (C^, ^t+1' ^t+1^ maximize:.
7) V = E 23 + - Vl -
where given by equation 2, and refers to the information set at
t. Our notation in equation 7 stresses the fact that the information set
may influence the optimal selection of C , M ,,, and/or K .Below, we
t t+1 tTl
drop the conditional notation for convenience. While there will always be
an interior solution for C^, and there may be corner solutions for
As clearly shown by Cass, Okuno, and Zilcha (1980), models such as
ours may yield solutions in which money is not held* The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions yield:
8) a) Vp = e(D^^^) - M>|. =0
X+i • "t+i =°
= -r = °
e) V, = P,(W^ - C^) - = 0
In order to determine C^, multiply 8d by and add to 8c in order to
obtain:
9) = X[P^(W^ - C^)]
Using 8a and equation 9:
10) « W^/2
Thus, consumption of the new generation will equal half of real wage income
regardless of the information set. In order to determine capital and money
holdings, however, it is necessary to specify how commodity and factor
prices are determined. Before we turn to price determination, it will be
helpful to obtain one further implication of the first order conditions. An
interior solution requires that equations 8b and 8d both equal zero. Thus,
an interior solution requires:
11) - (p,/p^+p)] = 0
As > 0» in a world of perfect foresight in which both money and
real capital are held, the real return on capital must equal the real
return on money holdings such presumption can be made in the
case of rational expectations.
8III, Market Clearing/Price Determination and Flexible Rates
If capital Is not mobile internationally, a flexible exchange rate
system is tantamount to a closed economic system. Market clearing requires
that output be equal to consumption by members of the working generation
(NC^), plus capital purchases consumption of the capitalists
(ND^ = + NR^K^):
NW NM
12) =-r + ^
Competition and constant returns to scale means that = NQ^ - NW^,
so that equation 12 can be rewritten as:
13) NW^/2 - NM^/Pj. + ^\+i'
If the economy is closed or if the exchange rate Is flexible, a passive
monetary policy acts to fix the nominal value of the money supply at M
(NM^ == Mfor all t). Given the magnitudes of the real variables in the
economy, equation 13 determines the domestic price level. Ex ante, equation
13 determines the distribution of prices. It is important to note that
equation 13 is in the information set of individuals; individuals use the
information contained in this equation when making their portfolio composi
tion decision. The simultaneous nature of the problem should be clear:
given and equation 13 determines the current price level, but the
distribution of prices, generated by equation 13, is used by agents in
I'
determining their holdings of capital.
In order to solve the system, define:
14) s, =
SO that s^ is the percentage of savings allocated to real capital. Using
equations 13 and 14:
15) M« Pj.(W^N)(l-Sj.)/2
The real wage is given by equation 5« Substitute equation 5 into
equation 15:
16) =(1-ci)4|j.K^^~"(1-8^)/2M
Update equation 16 by one period and form the intertemporal price
ratio:
^t+l
If both capital and money are held, equations 11 and 17 indicate:
t+1
18) E = 0
As long as 0 < a < 1/3, a solution to equation 18 is:
19) a) ®
^ TrOt*Tl-Ol
It is to be noted that s (the proportion of saving allocated to real capi
tal) is the same under perfect foresight and rational expectations.
Further, the economy saves at a rate which satisfies the golden rule* The
golden rule savings rate is such that the economy consumes all of its labor
income and uses the remaining output for capital formation. Given that s «
2a /(1-a), equation 12 can be rewritten as:
12*) + sWj./2 + Dj. or
12-) Q, - C^ + D^
The right-hand side of equation (12") is aggregate consumption at t
while the left-hand side is output minus the marginal product of capital*
Thus, labor's share of output equals aggregate consumption in each period of
time* One way to interpret this result is to consider the portfolio choice
10
problem in a world of perfect foresight. The rate of return on money
(P^/P^^^) is given by equation 17. For a constant value of s:
20)
Equating the rate of return on money to the marginal product of capital
21) = otQ^
Equation 21 demonstrates that capital accumulation equals
current payments to capital: capital accumulation is such that all labor
income is consumed, and the remaining output is used for capital accumula~
tion. While our ultimate aim is to compare fixed and flexible rates, some
further discussion of the flexible rate regime is in order# Table 1
presents the solutions for the endogenous variables; the solutions are for
the case of rational expectations as for the case of perfect foresight.
Three interesting observations arise from the table:
1. Current period values of the endogenous variables depend upon
current and previous values of the exogenous productivity distur
bances. The endogenous variables are serially correlated even if
the exogenous productivity disturbances are serially uncorrelated.
This result differs from models which do not allow for the presence
of real capital. In models in which domestic money is the only
asset (see Fischer (1977)), no saving is possible because the
current account and the balance of payments are identical. Without
real capital, flexible rates present any asset accumulations. In
our model, with a constant proportion of current income being allo
cated to capital, the capital stock will tend to fluctuate directly
with current output. Part of any generation's "above average"
output can be transferred into capital which can be used to produce
11
Table 1
Reduced Form Solutions for a Flexible Exchange Regime
l-a®.a
a 7T(t> .
0
l-Qoo a
<^t+i =«
/l~ttv l-ct<».a^ (1-ci)= Dt = (-^)a
yl-ttv l-a»,a
''t+i =
\+i = «<5t+i/'^ t+i =
_ 1 ^rt CO Ct
P = 2M/ (l-3ci)Tr(J>t Q t 1
^t'^^t+l ~ ^t+1
Ut = (Cj.D^_j_p723 = (1/2B)
23
't+lQ t-i
where; tt is the multiplication operator for which the index (i) runs from
0
zero to infinity.
Note that the realized values of the endogenous variables are presented in
the table. Variables, such as expected utility, are found by taking the
mathematical expectation of the entry in the table*
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output for the second period of life* In doing so, output, capital,
prices, and the other endogenous variables will .tend to be serially
correlated.
2. In any period t, consumption of the new generation and the old
generation will be equal (C^ =D^). Workers consume one half of
labor income (C^ =W^/2) and purchase sW^/2 units of capital. The
remaining output (Q - W /2 - sW /2) is the amount consumed by the
older generation:
Dj. = Qj. - (l-s)W^/2 = Q^.(l-a)/2 =
Even in the presence of uncertainty, individuals of overlapping
generations consume equal amounts so that the exogenous output and
endogenous price uncertainties are spread across overlapping gen
erations. Examination of the solution for indicates that the
utility of an agent born at t is affected by previous values of the
domestic output disturbances. Domestic disturbances in t-j (j > 0)
affect agents born in t in that the amount of capital brought into
t (hence the marginal product of labor in t) will be positively
related to past disturbances. This is to be contrasted with the
case of fixed rates for which it will be shown that past values of
the foreign (as opposed to domestic) disturbances affect
3. While the economy follows a golden rule path, the marginal product
of capital need not equal unity (even if there is perfect fore
sight). Examination of Table 1 indicates that the marginal product
of capital can be greater than unity, and a monetary equilibrium
will still exist. The relevant comparison is between the rates of
return on money and capital. Suppose ~ ^t^^t+1 ^
13
Additional capital holdings at the expense of money would lower
R , , but increase P /P ,. as P^ would increase and P^, would
t+i t t+i t tri
fall.
IV. Market Clearing/Price Determination and Fixed Rates
The system is quite different if the exchange rate is fixed. Notably,
for a small economy with a fixed exchange rate, commodity prices are deter"
mined on world markets as opposed to internal markets. In this section, we
will demonstrate that the differences in the commodity price determination
mechanism lead to differences in resource allocation and utility levels
under alternative exchange rate systems. The argument Is rather straight
forward: with a flexible exchange rate, commodity prices are negatively
correlated with domestic output disturbances. If agents in period t antici
pate that output in t+1 will be greater than output in t, they will also
anticipate that prices in t+1 will be lower than prices in t. Such is not
the case when the exchange rate is fixed. Domestic disturbances in t+1 will
have no effect on commodity prices In t+1. Price and output uncertainties
are, then, independent when the monetary authorities fix the rate of
exchange. Agents will respond differently to the different risks inherent
in the two systems, and attitudes toward the alternative regimes will depend
upon attitudes towards price uncertainty. (Clearly, then, there are
differing risks inherent in the alternative exchange rate regime so that it
is inappropriate to postulate asset demand functions which are invariant to
exchange rate policy.)
Equations 8a—8e remain the first—order conditions for expected utility
maximization, and equation 10 yields the consumption rule. Normalizing the
fixed rate of exchange to unity and ignoring transport costs, P = p* where
14
P* is the foreign price level in period t. If we assume an equilibrium in
which both money and capital are held, equation 11 can be rewritten as.
ID = 0
As was the case with flexible rates, to close the system it is
necessary to specify how commodity prices are determined. We postulate that
the structure of the large country replicates that of the small open economy
in all respects save one: the distribution and/or realization of distur
bances can differ across countries. The analysis in Section IX can be used
to solve for the endogenous variables in the large country. Letting 6^
represent the productivity disturbance in the large country in period t, the
intertemporal price ratio, identical in form to equation 20, is:
22) = P*/P*+1 = Q*+i/Q* =
where (except for 0^, we let starred variables represent the large country
counterpart of small country variables-—^ (Note that we assume a =a*,
although this is not essential for our results.) With a fixed rate of
exchange, individuals use equation 22 (as opposed to equation 13 or 20) in
making their portfolio decisions. Having specified the price determination
mechanism, it becomes possible to solve the system. In the case of rational
expectations, however, it is not possible to obtain analytic solutions: we
use Monte Carlo techniques to obtain rational expectation solutions in the
next section of the paper. The remainder of this section considers the case
of perfect foresight. We note at this point that the rational expectations
and perfect foresight cases are qualitively similar.
With perfect foresight, if both money and capital are to be held,
equation 11*) indicates that the marginal product of capital will be set
equal to the intertemporal price ratio:
15
23)
24)
With a fixed rate of exchange, the capital stock in any period depends
upon the domestic productivity term in that period and all present and
previous foreign disturbances. This is to be contrasted to flexible rates
where the capital stock depended upon the past and present values of the
domestic productivity disturbances* With a fixed rate of exchange, the
foreign productivity disturbances determine the intertemporal price ratio.
The value of the domestic disturbance in t+1 is important in that it affects
the marginal product of capital in t+1. As capital lasts only one period,
other values of the domestic productivity terms will not affect the capital
stock in t+1. Table 2 presents the solutions for the endogenous variables
for the case of fixed exchange rates and perfect foresight. Notice that the
domestic and foreign rates of return on capital are equal: in the large
country, money and capital will be held if ~ ^*+1 small
country both assets will be held if ^ ^t^^t+l' ^
fixed exchange rate system, the marginal product of capital will be
equalized across nations even though there are not any physical movements of
8 /capital across national boundaries.— With a flexible rate system, there
will be golden rule capital accumulation although the return to capital will
9 /
differ across nations.—
In comparing the values of the capital stock under the two exchange
regimes, it is necessary to know the particular realizations of the foreign
and domestic productivity terms. Even if such information were available,
it would be of limited usefulness, since the amounts of capital held under
16
Table 2
Reduced Form Solutions for a Fixed Exchange Regime With Perfect Foresight
1-ci ^l-oi ^
K « a , 0 , "tQ . ctQt+1 t+1 t+lQ t-i ^ ^t
1-a .1-a
0 s a (ii 0 ire^t+1 t+1 t+lp t-i
1-a,
°t+i =
(1+i)
CO Ca—1^ (ay
R « p* /p* = R* , = 0 ,7re^ jt+1 t ' t+1 t+1 t+lQ t-i
= (1/23)
23 1-K* 2
t+1 t ^t Qt-l-i
(i+1)
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each exchange regime would be fluctuating over time* Instead, It seems most
useful to compare the average or ex ante values of the capital stock under
the alternative exchange regimes. Specifically, we compare the expected
value of taken from Table 1 to the expected value of taken from
Table 2. In doing so. It Is possible to determine whether, on average, the
value of the capital stock will be greateir with a fixed rate or with a
flexible rate. We now demonstrate that, on average, the value of the
capital stock will be higher with a fixed rate if:
i) 6 and are both identically and independently distributed (l.d.d.),
t t
and
11) 0^ and 4)^ are uncorrelated.
From Tables I and 2:
1 1
25) E[4« - 4+1^] = '''t+l®t+lTr6 t-1 - ::^t-
0 ^ ' 0
Since domestic and foreign productivity disturbances have the same
independent distributions, the right-hand side of equation 25) can be
written as:
1
26)
1-a
't+1
I'O' I t?a I E
1
a-1
t+1
.1-a
*t+l
1
00 c*
0 t 1
1-a
- a E
1
«.ct
a-1
^+1
1
®,a
- E
1
».a
0 c 1
Using Jensen's inequality, E
' 1 ' ' 1
V .a-1
^t+1.*t+l. C| > 1, so that the term in
expression 26) is positive. Ihus, the expected value of the capital stock
will be greater with a fixed rate of exchange than with a flexible rate.
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Furthermore, It can also be shown that aggregate consumption and the level
of output can be expected to be greater with a fixed rate of exchange.
Ihus, asset holders find capital to be a more attractive store of value
with a fixed rate of exchange. By way of explanation, suppose that all
domestic and foreign disturbances had realized values of unity for all
periods of time up to and including period t. From Tables 1 and 2, the
capital stocks for t+1 under the two exchange regimes would be:
27)
With a fixed rate, the capital stock for t+1 is positively related to
A high realization of would produce a proportionate
increase in the marginal product of capital while a low realization of
would produce a proportionate decrease in the foreign (and domestic) price
level. With flexible rates, however, the product of atid is
invariant to the output disturbance in t+1 does not depend upon
because the value of the marginal product of capital would be invariant to
Since domestic prices and domestic productivity disturbance are
independent with fixed rates, the expected value of the capital stock will
be higher with a fixed rate than a flexible rate. Assuming the same
distribution for and Jensen's inequality indicates
— 1
(•^t+i/^t+l^^ >!• In other words, the expected value of the value of
the marginal product of capital would be higher with a fixed rate exchange
rate regime.
Individuals, however, will not base their preferences concerning the
exchange regime on the criterion of the size of the capital stock. An
individual will favor the exchange regime which yields the highest value of
19
utility. Depending upon the realizations of the domestic and foreign
productivity terms> members of some generations might prefer fixed rates,
while members of other generations prefer flexible rates. As above, we
compare the average value of realized utility under fixed rates to the
average value of realized utility under flexible rates. In doing so, we can
determine whether members of a randomly selected generation would prefer
fixed or flexible rates to prevail for all time periods. We continue to
assume that and 0^ are i.d.d. and uncorrelated.
represent tne utility znaz a
.t
Let U^. h th t n agent born at t would receive if
Fix
there were to be a fixed rate system and U_- represent utility if there
riex
were to be a flexible rate. Define:
28) X = =-^
' t Fix Flex 2p
^t+U^t+1 c
0
20
2
1-Ki 2
(i+l)
0 2B(
(1-a) 1-a
2
1
e 0^-1
t+i t ^ t-i-i
1 (1-a)
20 2
X.
If the expected value of is positive, members of a representative
generation will choose to have a fixed rate of exchange. We proceed by
showing that the expectd value of X^. is positive so that the sign of the
expected value of is determined by the sign of B. For the first step In
our proof that E(X^) is positive, note that the assumption that is I.d.d.
implies:
20
.0 «>.a^(c(+l)3
29) « E ^t+rt
Thus, the expected value of Is:
30) E(X^) = E
So long as 6 and come from Identical and independent distributions:
31) E(X^) ? 0 as E
t "t
To complete our proof, note:
32)
23 fl+o.\ r 23]
= E .-.J- >J < E h E
Lastly, since 0^ and (})^ are i«d*dt :
33) E
2B'
1-a
4',
'i-hx^v] r 2g .(vtof
> E
2\ .
-
(a+l)3
Since E(X^) > 0, it follows that the expected value of J^. depends upon the
sign of 3 (recall that 3 is a measure of the degree of risk aversion in an
uncertain environment and a measure of the degree of homogeneity of the
utility function). In order to provide an intuitive interpretation of our
findings, substitute equation 3 into equation 2 in order to obtain:
34) = [P^(W^ - C^) - P,K^+i]/P,+i + VlVl
Using equation 10, and assuming an interior solution: = ^t^t^^t+1 "
aPtQt/2Pt+i-
It is easily shown that and have a higher correlation with a fixed
rate of exchange than with a flexible rate* Domestic disturbances
21
simultaneously affect prices and output when the exchange rate is flexible:
high values of the domestic productivity disturbance are associated with
high values of and low values of This reduction in the
intertemporal price ratio acts to reduce the correlation between and
with flexible rates when is high, ^t^^t+1 low. Whether the
relatively high correlation between and present In a fixed rate
system is deemed to be desirable depends upon the nature of the utility
function. A positive correlation between intertemporal consumption bundles
means that lifetime consumption (Cj. + highly variable: a plus for
flexible rates, since the utility function is concave. It also means that
the proportion in which goods are consumed tends to remain stable: a plus
for fixed rates, since the marginal rate of substitution is diminishing. We
consider this point in further detail when we consider rational expectations
in the next section of the paper* The important point at this stage is that
our results are in marked contrast to the work of Fischer (1977), Laffer
(1973), and Mundell (1973), who argue that the choice of exchange regimes
depends upon the source of disturbances* We have shown the choice between
exchange regimes depends, in part, upon the nature of the utility function
as opposed to intermediate goals such as price or consumption stability*
In the next section of the paper, we consider the case of rational
expectations* While we cannot provide analytic solutions, we present a
Monte Carlo study to ascertain expected utilities and expected capital hold
ings under alternative exchange systems* It will be shown that 0®O remains
the dividing line in the choice between exchange regimes, although the
expected value of the capital stock is not always higher when the exchange
rate is fixed.
2^
V. Rational Expectations Simulation
In Section IV we were not able to provide analytic results for fixed
rates when agents had rational expectations. In this section, we simulate
the rational expectations case for the alternative exchange regimes. The
simulations allow us to compare the two regimes directly and to provide some
indications of the magnitudes of the differences betwen the regimes. The
results in this section reinforce the conclusion that very risk averse
individuals prefer flexible rates while less risk-averse individuals prefer
fixed rates. However, the results concerning the capital stock are somewhat
different from those of Section IV. With rational expectations, the
expected value of the capital stock under flexible rates can be greater than
that of fixed rates when capital's share (a), risk aversion, and/or foreign
output variability are sufficiently large.
In simulating the model, we assume that the productivity disturbances
are drawn from a trinomial distribution. Specifically, we let have the
distribution:
"l - S f(l-t) = 1/3
35) '(J>j. = <1.0 f(l) = 1/3 where: 0<i:<l
1 + l f(l+S:) = 1/3
For example, if we let E = .25, the domestic productivity disturbance
can take on values of .75, 1.0, and 1.25 each with a probability of 1/3. We
continue to assume that the domestic productivity disturbance is serially
uncorrelated and independent of the foreign productivity disturbance. The
foreign productivity disturbance is also assumed to be drawn from a symmet-
ric trinomial distribution with a mean of unity and variance of (2/3)(E*)
where Z* is the foreign counterpart of E. Using the Monte Carlo technique,
we performed the following steps:
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1. For each of fifty-one time periods, we determined whether the domestic
productivity disturbance would take on its low, mean, or high realiza
tion. Our procedure guaranteed that ifij. would have a calculated mean
of 1.0, variance of 2E^/3, and would be serially uncorrelated- We
repeated this process in order to determine realizations of the foreign
productivity disturbance.
2. Values of a, B, 2 and! 2* were specified, all endogenous variables were
initialized at their steady state levels, and the labor supply set equal
to unity. At this point, it was possible to solve the system for fifty
consecutive time periods under each exchange regime. Hie productivity
disturbances remained invariant to the exchange regime. Averaging
yielded the simulated values of variables such as the expected capital
stock and expected utility under fixed and flexible exchange rates.
3. Step 2 ws repeated in order to determine how the endogenous variables
are affected by changes in oi, B, and At this stage, step 1 was
not repeated so that the pattern of the realizations of the productivity
disturbances (i.e., low, mean, or high) was invariant to the choice of
a, B, 5:, or S*.
In Table 3, we present simulated values of the expected capital stock
under flexible exchange rates for three values of a and three different
assumptions concerning the variance of the productivity disturbances (the
capital stock under flexible rates does not depend upon B or 2*). We have
simulated over many sets of parameters, and the values chosen for the table
were selected to illustrate the qualitative properties of all parameter
sets.
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Table 3
Capital Holdings with a Flexible Exchange Rate^^
ct ~ .1 o = .2 a = .3
Z 7 0.0 3.871 6-687 8.954
Z = .25 3.839 6.607 8.804
Z = .5 3.783 6.439 8.469
— Divide each entry in the table by 50.0 to find
the expected value of the capital stock. The
entries in the table are sums over fifty
periods*
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As can be seen from Table 3, the expected value of the capital stock
with a flexible exchange rate Is positively related to and negatively
related to S. These results are in accord with our Intuition and can be
derived from Table 1. Alpha (a) represents capital's share of output so
that it is not surprising to find that increases in ot act to increase the
exepcted capital stock. In considering the effects of changes in S on
capital holdings, it is useful to consider the distinction between portfolio
size and portfolio composition. We have already demonstrated that the pro
portion of income saved and the proportion of savings allocated to capital
(s) were unaffected by the variance of the domestic productivity disturbance
(see equations 10 and 19a). Thus, for a given level of current income, an
increase in Z will have no effect on either portfolio composition or
portfolio size. By way of explanation, consider an individual in the first
period of life. With a flexible exchange rate, increased output variability
will be reflected in increased price variability. For the individual
currently determining portfolio composition, increased output uncertainty
simultaneously increases uncertainty concerning the return from holding
capital and the purchasing power of money balances during the second period
of life. While portfolio composition is unaffected by changes in Z, an
increase in the variability of the domestic output disturbance reduces
10/
expected output and thus reduces expected saving (and capital formation).
The situation is quite different with a fixed rate of exchange: the
expected value of the capital stock depends upon a, 3» S, and Z*. Table 4
shows how the expected value of the capital stock depends -upon a, 3, and Z
for a given variance of the foreign productivity disturbance* As was the
case with a flexible rate, the expected value of the capital stock is
positively related to and negatively related to Z. However, the
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Table 4
Capital Holdings with Fixed Rates:—^ I* = .25
beta a=.l a=.2 a = .3
• 5
.25
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
S - 0 3.931 6.737 8.659*
Z = .25 3.907 6.638 8.081*
Z = .5 3.821 6.198* 6.927*
Z= 0 3.967 6.779 8.679*
E = .25 3.931 6.630 8.0A7*
Z « .5 3.800 6.079* 6.746*
S « 0 4.003 6.820 8.700*
Z = .25 3.954 6.622 8.014*
Z « ,5 3.780* 5.962* 6.568*
1 = 0 4.149 6.989 8.779*
Z = .25 4.047 6.597* 7.865*
Z = .5 3.700* 5.457* 5.851*
Z = 0 4.296 7.156 8.855*
Z - .25 4.135 6.578* 7.703*
Z = .5 3.621* 5.073* 5.305*
— Divide each entry in the table by 50.0 to find the expected value of the
capital stock. The entries in the table are sums over fifty periods.
* Indicates that the expected value of the capital stock with flexible
rates is greater than that with fixed rates.
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mechanism by which changes In E affect the expected capital stock differs
across exchange regimes• Recall that a fixed exchange rate means that the
return on money holding ~ ^t^^t+P determined in the world
market while the return on capital is influenced by domestic and foreign
disturbances. Ihus, Increases in the variance of the domestic productivity
disturbance act to make money a relatively safer asset vis-a-vis physical
capital. With a fixed rate of exchange, changes in I will result in port
folio composition and portfolio size effects. Increases in the variance of
the domestic productivity term induce risk-averse individuals to substitute
money holdings for capital holdings within their portfolios. This port-
folio-composition effect is in addition to the type of portfolio-size effect
considered under flexible exchange rates.
In regard to the influence of the degree of risk aversion on expected
capital holdings, we find: increases in the degree of risk aversion
(decreases in 0) act to increase the expected capital stock when ^ is small
and to decrease the expected capital stock when Z is large. With a fixed
rate of exchange, a low value of Z means that (domestic) capital is the
relatively safe asset. Extremely risk-averse individuals,will hold more
capital in their portfolios than less risk-averse individuals. Alterna
tively, when the variance of the domestic productivity term is large, money
is the relatively safe asset. Extremely risk-averse Individuals will hold
less capital in their portfolios than less risk-averse individuals. For
example, in Table 4, decreases In 3 associated with decreases in the
expected capital stock when Z = .5 and with Increases in the expected
capital stock when Z ~ 0.
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While we have shown that an increase in domestic output variability
decreases the expected capital stock, it would be incorrect to conclude
that an increase in 'Z* would correspondingly increase the expected capital
stock* Consider an agent in the first period of life at time t, and let the
variance of the foreign output disturbance increase (of course, all agents
know that I* has changed, since we are considering rational expectations).
In that particular period, equation 22) indicates that the expected return
on money holdings has not changed since = P* is in the individual's
information set. From equation 22):
(a-l)o^
V—f
0
so that increasing the variance of the foreign productivity disturbances
will not change the expected return on money holdings when P* is known. The
increase in E* does increases the variability of the return on money hold
ings so that the agent in the first period of life would be expected to hold
more capital and less money. However, from an ex ante perspective (i.e.,
one in which P* is not given), the expected return on moey does depend upon
the distribution of the foreign productivity disturbance:
CO r n ^36) E(P*/P*^JP*) =
37) 3E(P*/P*^^)/3Z* = aE[ 0^_LTTrei_4 1/> 0
where the expectations operator runs over all Since changes in the
variability of the foreign productivity disturbance will increase the mean
and variance of the return on money, there is no necessary relationship
between and the expected domestic capital stock.
Tables 3 and 4 can be used to compare the expected value of the capital
stock under the alternative exchange regimes. In Table 4, a starred (*)
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value indicates those instances in which the expected value of the capital
stock was found to be greater with a flexible rate of exchange than with a
fixed rate. These results are contrary to the case of perfect foresight for
which it was found that average capital holdings with fixed rates were
always greater than average capital holdings with flexible rates# From
Table 4, it can be seen that flexible rates yield greater expected capital
holdings than fixed rates when: capital*s share (a) tends to be large,
individuals are strongly risk averse, and the variability of the domestic
productivity term (Z) is large. When Z is large, money holdings tend to be
a safe asset vis-a-vis physical capital when the exchange rate is fixed. As
mentioned earlier, highly risk-averse individuals will substitute money
holdings for capital when Z increases and the exchange rate is fixed. Ihus,
it is not surprising to find that the expected value of the capital stock
under fixed rates is less than that with flexible rates when Z is high and 3
is low. In regard to a, an increase in capital's share increases the
expected capital stock under either exchange regime. However, there tends
to be more portfolio diversification when the exchange rate is fixed as the
return on money is determined in the world market and the return on capital
is determined in the home and foreign market.
In Table 5 we present some of our simulations concerning expected
utility under the alternative exchange regimes. While space considerations
prevent a complete presentation of our results, all simulations indicated
that 3^0 was the dividing line between the choice of exchange regimes.
Expected utility was always greater with a fixed rate when B > 0 and always
greater with a flexible rate when S < 0. Moving from perfect foresight to
rational expectations does not change our qualitative result that the choice
between exchange regimes depends upon the degree of relative risk aversion.
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Table 5
Expected Utility Under Alternative Exchange Regimes:-^ 2- -25
\l* - .25
a = .1 a = -2
Beta '^^ "riex "fIx "flex W
.5 17.183 17.616 13.160 13.495
,25 58.463 58.906 51.150 51.586
-1.0 -225.98 -240.42 -387.77 -402.45
-2.0 -1111.5 -1A09.1 -3302.0 -3836.8
= .5
a = .1 d = .2 •
Beta^^ ^Flex ^Fix ^Flex ^Fix
.5 17.183 18.384 13.160 14.006
.25 58.463 59.690 51. 150 52.286'
-1.0 -225.98 -264.63 -387.77 -412.00
-2.0 -1111.5 -1190.4 -3302.0 -4269.8
— Divide each entry in the table by 50.0 to find expected utility. The
entries in the table are seen over fifty periods.
U
— Values for 3=0 are not reported. Simulations for 3 around zero Indicate
that fixed and flexible rates yield the same expected utility for 3=0.
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Further, this is precisely the result found in our previous paper [Lapan and
Enders (1980)] in which money was the only store of value, and domestic and
foreign disturbances were present. The key to explaining the choice between
exchange regimes does not hinge on the presence (or absence) of physical
capital, but rather on the nature of risk sharing present in the alternative
exchange rate regimes. Under either exchange regime, the return on capital
depends upon realizations of the domestic productivity disturbance. The
return on money depends upon domestic disturbances with a flexible exchange
rate and upon foreign disturbances with a fixed exchange rate# In this
regard, our results support those of Fischer, Laffer, and Mundell in that
there is more international risk sharing with a fixed rate than with a
flexible rate. However, as we have demonstrated, it would be incorrect to
conclude that.agents will prefer fixed to flexible rates. The international
risk sharing with fixed rates is desirable because it increases the covari-
ance between consumption in each period of life. Suppose, for example, that
wage income is above its mean value so that C^. and saving are above their
mean values. Since fixed rates act to stabilize the value of one*s savings,
and tend to be highly correlated when the exchange rate is fixed.
On the other hand, the presence of international risk sharing acts to
increase the variance of lifetime consumption (C^ + when is above
(below) average, will tend to be above (below) average. This
relatively high variance of lifetime consumption detracts from the relative
desirability of a fixed rate system for risk-averse agents. To put matters
another way, there is more intergenerational risk sharing with flexible
rates than with fixed rates. With a flexible rate, consumption of the
working generation at t is given by (l-a)Q /2, and capital purchased by the
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workers is aQ^ (see Table 1)- Thus, the amount consumed by the older
generation at t is also (l-a)Q^/2. Members of the younger and older
generations consume equal amounts and share equally in output risk when the
exchange rate is flexible. Whether international risk sharing is preferable
to intergenerational risk sharing depends upon the degree of risk aversion.
Before concluding, it is interesting to note that Table 5 indicates
that expected utility with a fixed rate may increase when Z* increases. The
reason is rather straightforward once it is remembered that price
uncertainty may be desirable [see Oi (1961)]. With a fixed rate, an
increase in 2* increases foreign and domestic price variability. When the
degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low (g > 0), increased price
variability can be deemed desirable.
VI. Conclusions
We have taken a step in the direction of obtaining a portfolio balance
model which can be used for a fair comparison of alternative exchange rate
regimes. Rather than postulate asset demand functions, the demands for
money and capital were derived from expected utility maximizing behavior.
This is particularly important, because the asset demand functions are not
invariant to the exchange regime. Portfolio diversification occurs because
of the presence of risk, and there are different risks inherent in each ex
change regime. Specifically, the real return on money holding is determined
on the world market with a fixed exchange rate and on the ,domestic market
when the exchange rate is flexible. The differing risk structures present
in the alternative exchange regimes mean that the asset demand functions
which prevail under fixed rates will not, in general, prevail under flexible
exchange rates. Furthermore, the assset demand functions will depend upon
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the Information set of individuals. In this regard, we have considered
asset holdings under conditions of perfect foresight and rational expecta
tions*
We have also considered the issue of the "choice between exchange
regimes" from a utility maximizing perspective. Using an overlapping
generations model, we have found that an individual's consumption during the
first period of life has a higher correlation with consumption during the
second period of life when the exchange rate is fixed. However, the fact
that fixed rates act to stabilize an individual's total lifetime consumption
has no normative significance. Instead, attitudes towards Intertemporal
consumption variability must be considered In choosing the optimal exchange
regime. Agents who are highly risk averse will prefer flexible exchange
rates, while agents who are mildly risk averse will prefer fixed rates.
34
Footnotes
1. As examples of what we mean by standard portfolio models, see Branson
(1977), Girton and Henderson (1976), and McKinnon (1969).
2. This point is made in both the Helpman and Razin (1979) and Lapan and
Enders (1980) papers.
3. Fischer (1977), Laffer (1973) and Mundell (1973) argue that fixed rates
are preferable to flexible rates in the presence of internal real
disturbances and that flexible rates are preferable in the presence of
external or internal nominal disturbances. The criterion used for
determining the optimal exchange regime was consumption stability. A
similar result was found in Enders and Lapan (1979), which extended the
Fischer paper to consider nontraded goods and capital mobility.
A. As is well known, there is some ambiguity in measuring risk aversion in
a two-good model. Forming the indirect utility function, the measure
of relative risk aversion used by Pratt (1964) would be 1-23 for
3 < 1/2. Using the principle of decreasing risk aversion to concentra-
ti'on developed by Leland (1968), the degree of relative risk aversion
is 1-3. In either case, risk aversion increases as 6 decreases.
5. Assuming constant returns to scale for each firm, if the are
distributed independently across firms, then all uncertainty can be
eliminated by having an "infinite" number of firms, each producing at
an "infinitessimal" level of output. Thus, we assume is identical
for all firms at time t.
6. Because productive functions are homogeneous of degree one and the (1)|
are identical'for all firms in period t, there is little to be gained
by distinguishing between output of the firm and aggregate output. In
the' text, we use the same notation to represent individual and
aggregate variables whenever the meaning is unambiguous.
7. Notice that when the exchange rate is flexible, the rate of exchange
depends upon the current and past realization of domestic and foreign
productivity terms (the exchange rate in t is given by Pt/P'f). This is
in contrast to Mussa (1977) in which it is shown that the current
exchange rate depends upon future disturbances. In our model, the
presence of real capital produces serial correlation in the endogenous
variables.
8. Introducing physical capital movements is rather quite simple. With
real capital movements: Rt+1 ° ^$+1* Thus, our results for fixed
rates would be essentially unaltered. With a flexible rate, Rt+1 °
Rf+I requires that Pt/Pt+1 = Pf/Pt+l* Introducing the coinmodity
arbitrage, equations P^ ® etPff and Pt+1 ® ®t+l^{!+l immediately
demonstrate that e^ = e^+i- Thus, the flexible rate system would be
identical to our case of fixed rates. Below, we show that flexible
rates without capital movements may be preferable to .fixed rates (with
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or without capital movements) and, thus, flexible rates with real capi
tal movements. Our results for the rational expectations case would be
altered, however, due to unanticipated differences in the realizations
of the domestic and foreign productivity terms#
9« Note that the concept of the golden rule is somewhat ambiguous in an
economy which can run a current account surplus or deficit, since
current consumption need not equal current output* While there is not
golden rule capital accumulation with fixed rates, the usual signifi
cance of golden rule saving is not applicable.
10. The application of Jensen's inequality to the reduced form solution for
output (Qt+l In Table 1) shows that expected output is negatively
related to the variance of the domestic output disturbance*
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